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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. TO LIVE AND DIE IN O.E. (THE CITY OF ORGUN-E), PAKTIKA 
PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN – SEPTEMBER, 2011 
As he approached a small food stand beside the money exchange, Gul Babrai’s 
youngest son likely focused on only one thing: honor. No one had paid him for what he 
was about to do. After all, his family was sufficiently wealthy. His pace quickened as he 
reached the cobblestone pavement of a narrow street lined with shops peddling sundry 
items. The oily smell of sizzling bargar sandwiches hung in the air, filling hundreds of 
passers-by with a sense of security. Gul Babrai’s scouts were correct; Zakim Khan was 
dining alone, without even his usual bodyguard. It did not matter that Zakim was not 
currently commanding troops, nor did it matter that he ever had. This business was 
personal. Zakim Khan was not an ostentatious man. He had fought for the Americans 
with his ragtag militia early in the war, made his money, and no longer cared which side 
emerged victorious in Paktika. His days now consisted of sipping tea in the Orgun bazaar, 
where he discussed local politics and the battles of his erstwhile opponents. The once-
feared commander was nothing but a figurehead in mid-2011; he controlled no political 
bloc or armed force. The days of informal, government-sanctioned warlords had ended. 
Zakim chose now to drink his tea with extra sugar, invite entertaining conversation, and 
keep a low profile. 
My bargar—a greasy mix of fried potatoes, peppers, and boiled eggs wrapped in 
Afghan flatbread—carried more salt than the Dead Sea. Our party sat near the hospital 
entrance, across the street from Zakim’s table, blissfully unaware of the latest political 
twist about to unfold in the bazaar. Zakim Khan had marginalized Gul Babrai’s influence 
in the area several years before; we knew of Gul Babrai’s current aspirations to challenge 
the district governor’s legitimacy, and that Zakim Khan was again frustrating these 
efforts by siding with the governor’s wealthy family. However, sometimes the simplest 
equations become muddied by perceptual errors. Seeing one of the most prominent 
citizens of Orgun riddled with bullets and slumped over an unfinished bowl of chukney 
provided me with a searing reminder that two plus two does indeed equal four. Zakim 
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Khan, hero of Operation Anaconda and numerous other engagements, was dead—not due 
to an extremist fatwa, but rather by order of his neighbor, Gul Babrai. 
B. RATIONAL ACTORS? 
Gul Babrai’s decision to assassinate Zakim Khan evokes a paradoxically simple 
and complex query: why do people think and act the way they do? Such a broad question 
touches on many disciplines and a multitude of approaches. Decision theory scholars 
claim that human behavior can be predicted, shaped, or even controlled under the right 
conditions.1 The key to influence and control in all approaches lies in the use of 
incentives—called maximizing individuals’ “expected utility.”2 Humans respond 
favorably to positive incentives, whether the reward is monetary in nature or simply a 
feeling of satisfaction.3 Logically, if incentive x produces behavior modification y, then 
human decision-making is essentially “rational” (that is purposeful) and incentives can 
“purchase” compliance (and thus lead people to make choices preferred by the influencer 
that maximize the targets’ expected utility). However, as many psychologists have noted, 
human action is not always logical and is not easily predicted.4 Furthermore, humans 
generally resent manipulation, sometimes to the point of active resistance.5 If expected 
utility clashes with intrinsic values within an uncertain environment, can behavior be 
reliably predicted or purchased? 
Those looking to influence others (“influencers” altering “target” behavior) 
increase their chance of changing behavior if the incentive system they employ is 
designed to increase the target’s perception of agency (the human capacity to exercise 
                                                 
1 Inspired by Selectorate Theory, Dr. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita proposes that a logarithm based on the 
rational self-interest of stakeholders can reveal future choices with high accuracy, thus allowing another 
party to test various strategies and engineer an outcome. For more information, see Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita, The Predictioneer’s Game (New York: Random House, 2009). 
2 As first derived in an appendix to the second edition of John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, NJ: The Princeton University Press, 1947).  
3 Albert Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 242. 
4 Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York: 
Harper Collins, 2008), 239. 
5 Bandura, Social Foundations, 247. 
 3
control over thoughts, motivations, and actions to change themselves and their own 
situation through their own efforts).6 In practice, enhancing agency means enhancing a 
target’s range of options and capacity to accomplish them; such an approach may seem 
counterproductive, should an influencer seek to engineer an outcome. The key element, 
therefore, is perception of control.  
Perception is derived from a set of intrinsic values and the narrative which frames 
the situation. Consider the case of Zakim Khan’s assassin: he fled the scene, running all 
the way to Ghazni City, some 200 kilometers away. Gul Babrai was summoned to meet 
with the elders and the District Council, in which he proclaimed that the killing was 
badal—an act of revenge—as sanctioned by the Pashtun code of ethics, an intrinsic 
system of values known as Pashtunwali. He knew that such a defense demanded 
retribution from Zakim Khan’s family, which was an outcome that no one wished to 
realize. When, where, and how would the next cycle of revenge begin? Would it escalate 
beyond families to encompass entire clans? The Tajik and Kharoti tribal elders of eastern 
Paktika spoke in hushed tones.   
Gul Babrai knew what was necessary to see the outcome he preferred. 
“Nanawatai,” he stated with resignation. He had invoked a second tenet of Pashtunwali, 
an act of contrition in which he would bind the two families together to avoid further 
bloodshed. In doing so, he effectively excommunicated his youngest son, exiling him 
indefinitely. Zakim Khan’s family was obliged to accept the offer, as was the council to 
approve it. Had Gul Babrai chosen to “bribe” the victim’s family with one hundred goats 
as compensation, they would likely have accepted the offer, waited a period of time, and 
then killed the most vulnerable member of the offending family, sparking a new round of 
killings and goat exchanges. Instead, the narrative which accompanied this social 
transaction reinforced communal norms and values, significantly lowering the probability 
of reneging.  
A social transaction begins with one step which precipitates a series of predictable 
actions; patterns of thought and action in a target audience are of obvious value to those 
                                                 
6 Albert Bandura, “Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory,” American Psychologist  44, no. 9 
(September 1989): 1175. 
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seeking influence over others. A study of stability operations conducted in Afghanistan’s 
Paktika Province (see Figure 1) from 2010 to 2012 illustrates how an incentive plan 
focused on enhancing perceived agency can “purchase” reliable behavior, provided the 
influencer conducts the transactions appropriately. Not unlike the steps of a social 
transaction, a proper incentive plan with appropriate transactions is, essentially, a dance.  
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II. PAKTIKA PROVINCE, 2010–2012: A CASE STUDY IN 
DECISION MAKING UNDER SEVERE UNCERTAINTY 
A. THE HARSH, PASHTUN COTILLION: A DANCE OF CONFLICT 
(SHKIN, PAKTIKA PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN, JANUARY 2010)  
As our helicopter swooped downward in ever-shrinking circles, we surveyed the 
physical terrain that framed our problem. Small, primitive houses punctuated a landscape 
of hard-scrabble farm plots in the valley.7 A shuttered bazaar sat on the Pakistani border, 
with a rutted dirt road snaking westward into the snow-topped mountains of Paktika 
Province. We saw neither pedestrian nor vehicle traffic; this was a land of isolation and 
deprivation, hardly worth a fight, yet it had witnessed some of the conflict’s most pitched 
confrontations.  
 
Figure 1.  Area of Operations, Southeastern Afghanistan 
Upon arrival, we met the infamous Commander Aziz. He was stocky with a thick, 
black beard, sporting a pressed set of modified fatigues in a black-and-green tiger stripe 
pattern. He wore a crisp, clean baseball cap with new Oakley sunglasses perched on the 
                                                 
7 This section is largely drawn from the author’s personal experience in Afghanistan from January 
2010 to February 2012. The majority of the story, including additional details, can be found in MAJ Mike 
Hutchinson, “Building the Future: An Unlikely Coalition and a Road in Rural Afghanistan,” CTX 4, no. 3 
(August 2014): 5–20. 
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brim. To say that Aziz—called Karwan, or “commander” by his soldiers and close allies 
—despised the Taliban is a gross understatement. He described in detail the predations of 
foreign fighters, his imprisonment in the 1990s, and near assassination in 2006. He 
outlined the enemy dispositions surrounding Shkin, from indirect fire positions to 
infiltration routes. Aziz saw himself as the gatekeeper. He protected the only “good” 
tribes of Paktika—those immediately surrounding his base—with a laser focus 
commensurate to his responsibility. However, in his eyes the responsibility ended at the 
borders of Bermel District. Through this limited perceptual lens, which essentially 
extended no further than the range of his after-market rifle optics, there was nothing 
beyond Shkin but the enemy, and his fellow Afghans were derelict in their duty to fight. 
On the third day, we prepared for the first of what would eventually be several 
hundred shuras (gatherings of decision-makers) as partners.8 Mohammad Azzam sat 
nervously in the briefing room. Azzam was the district governor of Shkin, and as Shkin 
was not recognized by the central government in Kabul, neither was he.9 Aziz outlined 
the talking points for the meeting: reporting procedures for discovery of improvised 
explosive devices, theft of the Ahmadzai Waziri tribe’s commercial trucks by the Kharoti 
tribesmen in the village cluster of Rabat, and a religious appeal for Afghan patriotism. 
Azzam’s role, as usual, would be as the religious foil to Aziz’s iron fist. Finally, 
speaking, I asked Aziz “What should I say?” “Nothing,” he replied. “Not this time. I will 
introduce you, but that is all. Until you see the area and hear how the people argue, and 
see how the Pakistanis keep the fire burning, you might say the wrong thing.” 
We walked through the main gate and to the shura building—a simple, plywood 
structure with a sand-filled blast wall on its east side to protect against rocket 
fragmentation. The wall had done its job; pockmarked from shrapnel and beginning to 
                                                 
8 A shura is traditionally a gathering of religious authorities to resolve a debate or grievance; however, 
in contemporary Pashtun parlance, it refers to any gathering of decision-makers to share information, 
debate the merits of potential actions, or settle disputes. 
9 Shkin is a community that lies at the southern tip of Bermel district on the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border, and is officially recognized as part of Bermel district. Due to intertribal feuds and an increasingly 
strong alliance with Aziz and his base at Shkin, however, the local tribes decided that Shkin should be its 
own district. These tribes first forwarded the proposal to the central government in Kabul in 2008, but to 
the author’s best knowledge, it is still an unofficial district with an unofficial governor. 
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split at its seams, the barrier ensured that the building would soon collapse from rot and a 
leaky roof instead. The scene provided a perfect allegory for Aziz’s protection of eastern 
Paktika Province. Aziz entered first, followed by Azzam, with me and my best interpreter 
in trail. We were the last to arrive, as is customary in these meetings. On the border, he 
with the most guns and money is most honored, and the simple tribes of Shkin were no 
match for our firepower and deep pockets. Our thrones were therefore the most intact of 
the plastic lawn chairs arrayed around the room. 
Following the mullah’s opening prayer, the script began. Sher Nawaz stood first. 
As the leader of the most powerful tribe, the Ahmadzai Waziri, it was his right. He was 
followed by the Banzai Kharoti leader, Mir Afzal. Azzam punctuated the series of 
monologues in a forceful, authoritative tone that seemed completely contradictory to his 
previously timid demeanor. It was as though he spent the course of each week hoarding 
his energy for a two-minute burst of emotion. I sat silently behind Aziz as my interpreter 
whispered the main points of this political theater. No debatable observations or 
inflammatory statements had emerged; it was no wonder the previous Special Forces 
team had praised the functioning local governance of Shkin, for despite its rustic 
trappings the shura might have been televised on CSPAN. 
Before Aziz could conclude the meeting, a younger man stood up, pointed his 
finger at the Kharoti elders, and began to shout. A disgruntled murmur passed through the 
assembly, as I turned to my interpreter with a quizzical look. “That is Daria Khan, a 
Langikhel Kharoti from the town of Rabat,” he stated. “He used to work for Aziz, but 
now he is just a thief and a trouble-maker. He is probably the one who stole the Waziri 
trucks.” “What’s he saying?” I asked in a clear tone, as the roar of the argument began to 
rise. “He says the elders in Rabat are all Talibs that pay money to Chamtu, a very bad 
guy. He wants to raise a force to fight the Talibs and says Aziz and the other Kharoti 
leaders need to support him.” Aziz deftly defused the tension, adjourned the meeting, and 
led our contingent out of the building. My curiosity was piqued; addressing him by his 
title, I asked, “Tell me about Rabat, Karwan.”  
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Figure 2.  Depiction of Rabat Village and its Tribal Boundaries 
A large, laminated map of eastern Paktika hung from a piece of ¾″ plywood in 
the briefing room. Aziz’s military map-reading skills were adequate to describe Rabat’s 
internal and external tribal conflicts, as well as its attractiveness as an insurgent 
facilitation hub and piracy mecca (see Figure 2). Five clans converged on a confluence of 
intermittent streams, which formed a small but permanent river; as the snowpack from 
the mountains melted in April, Rabat experienced an annual ravaging of flash floods, 
eroding their best plots of land. As the land shifted, so did the balance of power. The 
Issakhel and Langikhel were now competing for the orchards, as the Abbaskhel slowly 
encroached on grazing land from the north. To the east, the neighboring Otmanzai Waziri 
tribe maintained a shaky truce with the Kharoti in Rabat; the slightest provocation could 
ignite a tribal war. 
Aziz traced the crumbling dirt road from the border at Shkin, northwest through 
Rabat, and then jabbed his finger forcefully on a narrow pass north of the town. “This is 
Spedar. It is the worst of places. Many ambushes—one of the 7th Group engineers was 
killed there a few years ago. Every time I go here, it is a fight.” “Why is it so important?” 
I asked. “There are other routes around further in the mountains.” “Those routes are hard 
to drive. The trucks might break. If the trucks break, the talibs will mine all the ways out 
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and it will cost us.” I wondered aloud, having seen the incredible ability of an Afghan to 
drive a low-riding Honda Civic over the roughest of passes, if it affected the large 
“Jingle” trucks which carried commercial supplies in the same manner. “It is possible, 
just like for us. But if they break it is expensive in time and money. That’s why they pay 
the toll in Spedar.” The toll was not only to the Taliban; as Chamtu’s group moved on to 
other camps and ambush sites, the tribesmen of Rabat took turns extorting any through-
traffic. Aziz stated plainly that it was their best means of making money. “When can we 
go to Rabat? The team needs to see it firsthand.” Aziz quickly replied, “We can go 
tomorrow. We will summon the Maliks, the leaders of each clan, when we arrive. You 
will see how they act.” 
The drive to Rabat, though only fifteen kilometers, took more than two hours. To 
call the route at that time a “road” is an insult to civil engineers worldwide. As we 
emerged from the mountains and descended towards the cluster of clan villages which 
composed the town, it appeared to be a dustbowl. However, as we dismounted our 
vehicles and proceeded on foot along the flanks of the convoy, we travelled through the 
most lush greenery and orchards we had seen so far. This land was indeed worth fighting 
over. We entered the Rabat bazaar, a shanty town of closed mud huts, by way of a 
circuitous path which revealed a defaced and abandoned elementary school. Numerous 
crumbling masonry culverts and dams dotted the route. Our interpreter noted our surprise 
at the engineering attempt, stating “CARE International put them here when the Taliban 
was in charge. But they are hollow like this place now.” 
We entered the lone tea house situated beside the lone auto shop, which was 
adjacent to the lone pharmacy. Even the mosque seemed decrepit. The maliks of Rabat 
slowly arrived, and our interpreter provided me with a hushed biography of each as they 
entered. “That is Malik Asgrar. He is the biggest talib here. Malik Bengal is an ok guy, 
but he is afraid,” and so on. When Malik Abdul entered the room, all rose, including 
Aziz. Apparently, he was the man upon whose opinion the sentiment of the town turned. I 
shook his hand in the ritualistic manner, and as he proceeded to his seat beside Aziz, the 
invocation of the mullah began. 
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We discussed Chamtu and his Taliban operatives, the theft of Waziri trucks, the 
extortion of commercial traffic – all the sins of Rabat’s clans. Malik Asgrar countered 
each point as it was posed. Aziz’s patience began to falter; he stated, “Security is my 
responsibility. If you do not side with the government and stop supporting the talibs, I 
will be back, and it will not be for tea.” Asgrar sat silently this time with a determined 
glare. “What are we to do?” asked Malik Abdul. “It is fine to say the government 
supports us, but who will get here first? This matter is not about supporting the Taliban, it 
is about our survival. Even if we stand, we will be weakened, and when we are weakened 
the Otmanzai will come. Perhaps they will come with the Ahmadzai as well. The Banzai 
are safe by your base, but there are no bases here.” As we left the tea house and the elders 
dispersed to their respective villages, I spotted Daria Khan. “What can we do to change 
things here? What will convince the elders?” Without hesitation, he responded. “Kill 
Chamtu.”  
B. MOTIVATION AND HUMAN AGENCY 
Robustness, in decision theory, refers to a decision’s degree of immunity to 
uncertainty.10 In other words, a robust decision is one that has accounted for its 
vulnerabilities and mitigated these risks to the highest degree possible, given a severe 
amount of uncertainty. Robust decision-making (RDM) is an analytic framework 
employed by the RAND Corporation to aid clients in analyzing strategy and policy under 
similar uncertain conditions.11 Given the historical decision-making pattern of the 
aforementioned elders, an equally-explanatory acronym might have been “Rabat 
Decision-Making.” Decades of war and deprivation had robbed Rabat, as well as the rest 
of Paktika, of any measure of certainty, and their decision-making patterns reflected the 
confusion. If the elders had no idea who would provide the next higher level of 
governance next month, what the crops would yield, if a flash flood would kill their 
                                                 
10 Yakov Ben-Haim, Info-Gap Decision Theory: Decisions Under Severe Uncertainty, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Elsevier, Ltd., 2006), 42. 
11 “Robust Decision-Making,” last modified November 12, 2014, http://www.rand.org/topics/robust-
decision-making.html. 
 11
children, if the Otmanzai would invade, if the Americans and their proxies would start 
caring, or worse, start raiding—what were they to do?  
The elders chose to be as robust as possible, which meant theft, graft, hoarding, 
and violent deterrence. In effect, they were a model of Info-Gap Theory in a Hobbesian 
landscape.12 They roughly estimated what outcome their strategy would produce, and 
then added an increasing level of safeguards to ensure that a realistic worst-case scenario 
would not topple the fragile social order. Rabat’s conservative strategy was designed to 
prevent a catastrophe, but never to exploit a windfall. But why would they consider a 
windfall? What windfalls had they experienced, or observed among their neighbors? It is 
likely that they viewed an optimistic strategist suggesting the potential for a grand 
opportunity as a snake oil salesman.  
The environmental context of Rabat in early 2010 surely did not provide cause for 
optimism. Within the village, the most powerful clan, the Langikhel, sought to maintain 
the status quo. Meanwhile, the Abbaskhel subtly took advantage of the Langikhel’s 
orchard dispute to seize additional grazing land. Looking externally, all of Rabat’s clans 
suspected that their eastern neighbor, the powerful Otmanzai tribe, intended to annex the 
Gol Kot watershed area (see Figure 3). Given Rabat’s internal divisions, the only buffer 
against such an encroachment was Chamtu’s Taliban group.  
                                                 
12 Info-Gap Theory is a framework for dealing with decisions under severe uncertainty; developed by 
Israeli scholar Yakov Ben-Haim, Info-Gap theory distinguishes itself from Bayesian analysis through a 
non-probabilistic function. Much like RDM, Info-Gap seeks to address severe uncertainty by reversing 
Expected Utility Theory’s “predict then act” framework by focusing first on strategic vulnerabilities, then 
on developing mixed or expanded strategic options to address these vulnerabilities by preparing to survive 
a worst-case scenario or exploit an opportune windfall. Courses of action are based on estimates which are 
admittedly prone to be far from the intended mark, which has prompted some criticism. For more on Info-
Gap Theory, see Ben-Haim, Info-Gap Decision Theory: Decisions Under Severe Uncertainty, cited above. 
For more on its primary criticism, see Moshe Sniedovich, “Fooled by Local Robustness,” Risk Analysis 32, 
no. 10 (October 2012): 1630–1637, DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01772.x. 
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Figure 3.  Depiction of Otmanzai Tribal Boundary Adjacent to Rabat Village 
To deter the Otmanzai without Chamtu’s intervention, Rabat would need to 
improve its military and economic position relative to this adversary. This goal would 
prove problematic. Only a unified set of clans could muster the required number of 
fighting men to hold the ground in the short term. Worse, from a long-term economic 
perspective the town was a proverbial island. Its clansmen were not welcome in 
Otmanzai territory, nor were they able to open new ventures further west in Surobi 
District. The only available economic opportunities were in Rabat proper, but its native 
population could not sustain more businesses and the town was considered a den of 
thieves by commercial travelers. It must have seemed to the elders of Rabat as though 
they were slaves to their environment. The elders provided an excellent example of actor-
observer asymmetry; their potential actions and realized decisions were constrained, in 
their opinion, by external factors beyond their control, which partially explains their 
tendency towards robust decision-making.13  
                                                 
13 Edward E. Jones and Richard.E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the 
Causes of Behavior (New York: General Learning Press, 1971), 80. 
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From an observer’s point of view, humans may have as much of an effect on their 
environment as it exerts upon them.14 Whether it is the creation or maintenance of a 
system of authority, investment in a technology which can ease one’s burden of labor, or 
a decision to pick up litter, humans possess some degree of capacity to change their 
circumstances through purposeful action, or “agency.”15 This degree of agency is 
contingent upon numerous factors, but it nonetheless exists. Sanctions can influence 
one’s perception of capacity, as Chamtu’s implied threat of execution no doubt weighed 
upon the elders’ decision-making, yet exercise of agency and fear of sanctions are both 
motivated by the cognitive capacity for forethought. 
Forethought, on its own, can provide strong incentive or disincentive for action 
based on previous experiences; however, combined with the cognitive capacity for 
symbolism and reflexive thought, humans are capable of generating new, innovative 
ideas and acting upon them.16 The primary constraint of this capacity is resources. One 
may be able to envision a superior product, but without the access required to sell a 
product, or the financial means to generate a prototype, an idea will not be realized.  
The fundamental conclusion is that humans desire and seek the ability to act as 
causal agents within their environmental context, and this pursuit is a prime motivator of 
behavior.17 Accumulation of resources, at its core, is an attempt to increase an individual 
or group’s degree of agency. In simpler terms, humans desire to be masters of their own 
destiny. The perception of efficacy in realizing this outcome, however, is often an 
obstacle.18 A neighbor may demonstrate a path to achieve a desired outcome, yet if the 
observer does not believe he possesses the requisite skills or capacity to emulate it, he 
                                                 
14 The reciprocal causality of environment and human behavior is well documented; for a social realist 
perspective; see Margaret S. Archer, Being Human: The Problem of Agency (Cambridge: The Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 258, for a Social Cognitive Theory treatment, see Albert Bandura, “Human 
Agency in Social Cognitive Theory,” American Psychologist 44, no. 9 (September 1989): 1180.  
15 Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, “What is Agency?” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 4 
(January 1998): 963. 
16 Bandura, “Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory,” 1180. 
17 Alfred R. Mele, Motivation and Agency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 38. 
18 Bandura, Social Foundations, 391. 
 14
may persist in apathetic or counterproductive behavior. In these cases, intervention may 
be required.  
Rabat was not alone in its perceived powerlessness; every town and village in the 
region suffered from the same psychological despair. After thirty years of war, no one 
had observed a path to prosperity and its associated causal agency. Moreover, even had 
they visualized a path, no group could succeed on its own. External intervention was 
necessary. However, if purely external forces provided the glue that binds the enterprise, 
the effort would undoubtedly collapse at the first absence of these forces.19 Killing 
Chamtu would be necessary but not sufficient to produce a sustainable outcome. The 
team needed to convince Rabat and other villages of their own agency and efficacy, and 
to set conditions which would make them believe they were masters of their own destiny. 
In our operations center in Shkin, the team debated what was to be done. Spring 
had not yet arrived, and we had used the winter months to visit the majority of the 
communities, witnessing the same passive acceptance of poverty and Taliban 
psychological control in each. A correlating scene of abandoned bazaars, crumbling 
infrastructure, and failing crops throughout the valleys provided a visual context of this 
hopelessness. Most families reluctantly sent at least one son to join the Taliban ranks, 
while also sending a son to the government security forces, both to hedge their bets for 
the uncertain aftermath and to glean what little income they could. 
Arriving in country in January, we expected to continue the previous strategy in 
Shkin—strengthen control of the border. This approach matched Aziz’s perception of the 
security situation, the desire of the supportive Shkin tribes, and even the doctrine 
forwarded by the Army’s field manual on counterinsurgency. However, given the 
political shift in our headquarters to support the nascent Village Stability Operations 
(VSO) mission, and the debate in Kabul over the proposed Afghan Local Police (ALP) 
program, we knew we would soon receive a change of mission.  
                                                 
19 Gordon H. McCormick , Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: 
TheEndgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 335. 
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As we scribbled notes and graphics on a six-foot-square map of the region, and 
glanced at maps of water relief and graphics of population density, a subtle outline 
emerged from our military map. I drew the boundaries of a corridor running from 
Karachi, Pakistan to the Ring Road highway in Ghazni. “This is where the people are, 
and this is where the chance for profit is. From the port at Karachi, north by rail to South 
Waziristan, then by road to Kabul and Kandahar, and it all cuts right through here (see 
Figure 4). If we open a secure economic corridor, the people will profit and they’ll be 
motivated to protect their investment.” The intelligence sergeant chimed in, feverishly 
drawing circles on the map, “there’s a lot of potential, but we’ll have hard sells in Rabat 
and Surobi just to reach the hub in Orgun. And even if we convince Rabat, we’ll have to 
secure Spedar before we can do anything else.” He continued by highlighting the points 
of political pressure we could use to sway Rabat. 
Our resident politician on the team, a staff sergeant who was once a local elected 
official in Massachusetts, noted that political maneuvering could produce verbal and 
written commitments, but behavioral commitment was a step further. “They need to 
believe that the profit will come, and they need to believe it’ll stay after we leave. We 
can’t just secure the corridor, we need to pave it. At that point, they’ll be so invested 
they’ll have to fight for it.” Other team members noted that in the “Money as a Weapons 
System–Afghanistan (MAAWS-A)” document, as well as our discussions with 
development organizations and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), no appetite 
for road paving existed.20 The intelligence sergeant retorted, “if we secure the route and 
the Afghans clearly rise up against the talibs, and all that the people want in return is 
asphalt, the headquarters in Kabul will have no choice but to finish the road they started 
in the provincial capital, Sharana. If we build it, they will come.”  
                                                 
20 United States Forces – Afghanistan, “Money As A Weapons System – Afghanistan: Commander’s 
Emergency Relief Program (CERP) SOP,” USFOR-A Publication 1–06 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Forces – 





Figure 4.  Proposed Economic Corridor Through Paktika Province, 
Afghanistan 
I sat quietly for a moment, considering what the team had proposed. “We’ll never 
sell this to the tribes in our words. We need Afghans to sell it for us. To convince the 
salesmen, we’ll need to inspire them. We’ll tell them they’re going to create a new 
Torkham Gate, without Kabul, without the Americans.21 They’ll build it, and they’ll own 
it. MAAWS-A is for dollars. This profit will be in Rupees.”22 The most aggressive 
member of the team, which is quite an honorific given his peers in the circle, stated the 
final point of the strategy plainly. “I love your theory, but these people respect strength. 
That’s why they respect the talibs. Tell me where we get to fight someone to inspire the 
buy-in for the grand plan.” All eyes turned to a tiny point on the map: Spedar. 
Aziz’s assertions that every trip through the Spedar Pass resulted in a fight were 
not entirely accurate. When dismounted forces cleared the high ground which flanked the 
road prior to convoy arrival, the trip involved nothing beyond discovering improvised 
explosive devices. If we were to provoke an engagement, we needed to be vulnerable. 
Aziz dispatched two of his most adept mine-spotters dressed in full Taliban garb through 
the pass on local motorcycles a half-hour before our arrival. As we neared the northern 
end of the pass, the ambush began. After several minutes, the firing had ceased. We did 
                                                 
21 Torkham Gate is the primary economic entry point to eastern Afghanistan, located in Nangarhar 
Province. 
22 The Pakistani Rupee is the dominant form of cash in southeastern Afghanistan, and is more valuable 
and trusted than the domestic Afghani currency. My statement reflects a belief that an open, secure road 
would provide enduring economic benefit regardless of the presence of foreign troops and cash.  
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not attempt to immediately pursue the talibs, but slowly crested the western high ground 
on foot. Eight of Chamtu’s men were dead, although he was not among them.  
We met again with the maliks, and Aziz pressured them for support. “Why are 
you afraid of Chamtu? We beat him easily, and you have hundreds more men.” “You 
beat him this time, but he is still alive, and now he is surely angry,” Malik Bengal 
retorted. “If he thinks we support you, he will come at night to our houses, not fight us in 
the pass.” Clearly, a comparison of available firepower would not sway them. I 
whispered in Aziz’s ear, “Tell them about your plan.” Aziz nodded, continued with his 
normal line of discussion, and once clear of the perception that I had influenced his 
words, he channeled his inner Socrates. “Malik Abdul, how many Jingle trucks come 
through here each week?” “Maybe a dozen, sometimes more,” Abdul replied. Aziz noted, 
“But a hundred reach the bazaar in Orgun each week, and this is the shortest route from 
Wana.” Abdul was not immediately convinced, stating “True, but the route from Gomal 
is smoother, so they can make up the time.” The series of questions continued until the 
seed was planted. If the route was secure and free of tolls, and the road was in good 
condition, more trucks would come. If the town was secure, the trucks would prefer to 
stop in Rabat rather than in Surobi. An influx of trucks and weary travelers required more 
shops, service stations, and even hotels. Malik Abdul’s expression betrayed his 
agreement, although his words remained resolute. Rabat would not side against Chamtu. 
We left the meeting, and as we approached the southeastern turn towards Shkin, 
Aziz’s ICOM radio crackled. A Taliban assassination cell had attempted to reach the 
house of Sher Nawaz. Not to fear, Aziz reassured us; the Ahmadzai trapped them and 
killed them all. The route through the Bermel wadi (valley) to the east was faster, 
although much less secure, and our vehicles raced through the tree-lined washout to meet 
the victorious tribesmen. The inventory of seized equipment suggested that this was a 
highly specialized team of killers. Aziz took the four bodies to the Bermel District Center 
for repatriation or burial, after which we returned to Shkin. As I sat in the operations 
center that evening writing my daily report, I knew that a crystal ball was not necessary 
to see our future; in short order, we would be re-missioned as a VSO team. Our 
headquarters would expect us to ally with the Ahmadzai, but in our mind the tribe was 
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merely the foothold—we needed another shura in Shkin, and we needed Rabat’s maliks 
to be there. 
C. RABAT’S CHANGING ALLEGIANCE 
The preparation for the shura between Shkin and Rabat was intensive. We held 
several preliminary meetings with the Shkin elders, collectively and individually. Azzam 
jotted copious notes, eventually producing a draft agreement of Rabat’s unequivocal 
support to the Afghan government. It was Aziz’s idea to produce formal, written 
agreements signed and sealed in thumbprint. He explained to us that culturally, the 
agreement would deny the signatories the ability to provide financial or material support 
to the insurgency. It would not change private attitudes, but it would provide a framework 
free of elder meddling in which to recruit the young people into a local defense force, 
traditionally referred to as chalwesti in the region. Every Shkin elder memorized his role 
in the script and his key talking points. We were confident that given enough collective 
pressure, the maliks’ only remaining argument would be a lack of defensive fortifications 
in the community. We began coordinating for the materials and heavy equipment 
required. We would build it, and they would come. 
The tribes’ and team’s combined preparations appear to have worked; in less than 
two hours, the stunned maliks of Rabat emerged from Azzam’s office. The nervous group 
returned north under Aziz’s escort to the village, and sent word to Chamtu. It read 
simply, “You cannot come to Rabat. We have an agreement with the government. We 
have no choice.” Several days later, we received word that a delegation from Chamtu had 
indeed arrived, sat with the elders, and the message was reiterated. That night, several 
rocket-propelled grenades struck the wall of Malik Abdul’s house. No one was hurt; 
Daria Khan arrived with a dozen heavily armed men to stand guard until dawn. Rabat 
was committed, albeit reluctantly. The onus was now on the team to find Chamtu. 
For two weeks we neglected our normal routines, shuras, and patrols. Chamtu 
was the only goal. Aziz and the team repositioned to Orgun to shorten our response time 
to Rabat. We received additional resources from our chain of command to aid in the 
search, but still had not found our white whale. His group attacked the Surobi District 
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Center with mortar fire, prompting another patrol. Aziz was clearly frustrated, as were the 
members of the team. “I’m not feeling well today,” he told me. “My deputy Faqir will 
lead the patrol.” The news further demoralized the team. Faqir lacked Aziz’s competence 
and leadership skills, and had a volatile personality. “Alright Aziz, we’ll tell you what we 
find,” I grudgingly replied. 
In short order, Faqir took a wrong turn and we found ourselves drifting aimlessly 
through ominous mountain passes in the Taliban stronghold of Charbaran (see Figure 5). 
Our attempts to guide Faqir back to the valley were failing, and finally our interpreter 
passed him the message “turn east at the next pass and keep going.” He obliged, and we 
found ourselves cresting the mountains through a dense alpine forest. As we descended 
towards the village of Nawi Kalay, we were relieved that, if nothing else, we were 
heading in the right direction. The forest continued to thin; my Humvee was third in line 
as we reached the tree line. I heard an excited shout from my gunner. My eyes shifted to 
the left, tracing the turn of his turret, and widened as I met a similar gaze from Chamtu’s 
entire force, perhaps seventy-five meters away and comfortably encamped. No orders 
were given; our convoy wheeled left and accelerated. 
 
Figure 5.  The Taliban Safe Haven of Charbaran 
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The rapid thump of heavy machine guns and staccato blare of every light weapon 
was punctuated by intermittent explosions as our vehicles jostled over the uneven terrain, 
and the shocked Talibs retreated in the only direction they could—into the open valley. 
The fight was over before it began, and as we secured our final position, our intelligence 
sergeant frantically moved from body to body with a picture of Chamtu. “I think this is 
him, guys…I think we got him.” We slowly gathered in a circle to look upon the white 
whale. There was little doubt in our minds, and what remained was cast aside as the 
reports flowed in from across Surobi—“Chamtu is dead. They’re all dead.” We returned 
in several days to Rabat with equipment and supplies to begin work on their fort and were 
welcomed as heroes.23 The men were standing in formation, ready to participate in the 
defense of their community. They were emboldened. Working alongside Aziz and his 
soldiers, the once-contentious clans erected their unified fort in three days. As we drove 
away towards Shkin, we spied the Afghan flag fluttering in the breeze on the highest peak 
above the town.  
Rabat’s changing allegiance provides a clear example of external intervention 
providing a marked improvement in agency and efficacy. With the psychological specter 
of Chamtu removed, the clans set to work in implementing their economic revival plan. 
Within two months, the town opened an additional hotel, resumed education in the 
dilapidated schoolhouse, and made preparations to open a gas station. However, 
Chamtu’s killing was essentially a stroke of good fortune. Would our persistence in the 
hunt have made the outcome inevitable, and could the time dedicated to that task become 
a cost which exceeded the benefit of alternate courses of action? To answer the question, 
an examination of our shortcomings in the Rabat agreement is necessary. 
Accumulating fiscal wealth in Rabat was a long-term prospect dependent on 
numerous variables, while the coerced nature of the initial security agreement 
immediately caused a loss of social and political capital among the village clans. The 
maliks were painfully aware of their manipulation by Aziz and the Shkin elders; coercion 
                                                 
23 Yaroslav Trofimov, “U.S. Enlists New Afghan Village Forces,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704103904575336933258787038.   
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and manipulation tend to breed resentment, and surely this was the case in Rabat.24 The 
importance of this mental frame cannot be understated; when people are profoundly 
unsatisfied with the status quo, they are prone to accept an increasing amount of risk to 
change their situation.25 VSO as conceived presented the positive side of this coin—a 
community whose resentment for the Taliban had made the risk of opposing the 
insurgency a risk worth assuming. We had delivered the opposite by initially depriving 
Rabat of their last shred of agency. It is highly probable that had we failed to kill Chamtu, 
or had Aziz died in combat first, the fragile allegiance would have disintegrated and 
worsened the situation. 
However, our gamble was well-founded in one regard: the sociological 
underpinnings of a shame-based culture.26  While classifying Pashtuns as a shame-based 
culture is a simplification of reality, the power of honor and shame among the tribes 
provides a vital point of leverage. If utility is the ability of a good to satisfy a need or 
want, and honor is the paramount need in such a culture, then the relative utility of a good 
is also measured by its ability to increase honor. The loss of Rabat, even if coerced, had 
shamed Chamtu. Action was required to restore his honor, as evidenced by the immediate 
attack on Malik Abdul’s compound. Ironically, that attack and those which targeted the 
Rabat fortifications following Chamtu’s death solidified the clans into a unified front. 
Aziz and Daria Khan had shrewdly manned the fort with representatives of each clan. 
While it initially proved to be an awkward arrangement, they knew that an attack on the 
outpost was inevitable; if every clan was the object of the attack, honor required that the 
competing factions combine to satisfy a communal need for vengeance. As a result, 
service in the Chalwesti local defense force came to provide the best relative utility by 
increasing social capital, and fueled Rabat’s perception of enhanced agency.  
 
                                                 
24 Peter F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings 
from the Contemporary Debates, ed. by Paul Russell and Oisin Deery (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 66. 
25 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” 
Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March 1979): 287. 
26 Millie R. Creighton, “Revisiting Shame and Guilt Cultures: A Forty Year Pilgrimage,” Ethos 18, no. 
3 (September 1990): 285. 
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III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF CATASTROPHIC 
SUCCESS 
A. INCENTIVES 
Incentives are a means of feedback to encourage or discourage certain actions. 
Cognitively, humans require feedback to survive; without a means of positive or negative 
reinforcement, no distinction can be drawn between constructive and destructive 
behavior.27 Physical or psychological feedback therefore contributes to forethought 
regarding the outcome if the action is repeated. Positive feedback generally supports 
repeating the action, while negative feedback discourages the same. However, erroneous 
beliefs regarding cause and effect tend to play havoc with humans’ natural feedback 
loops.28 When consequences are delayed or irregular, errors in judgment are more 
difficult to detect.29 The rapid expansion of our VSO effort following our initial success 
in Rabat illustrates the problems of erroneous cause-and-effect beliefs. 
Word spread rapidly of Chamtu’s death, as well as our victory in the Taliban 
stronghold of Pirkowti. Seventeen clans from Orgun to Surobi quickly signed agreements 
to support the Afghan government. My thoughts were preoccupied by self-satisfaction, 
but it was short-lived. Frankly, I was not prepared for the effort to expand so rapidly. We 
did not possess enough equipment and material to build any additional community 
fortifications, nor supply local defense forces with radio communication. I thought 
hopefully of the pending approval of the ALP decree, which promised to outfit our 
irregulars once they were properly trained and vetted by the Ministry of the Interior. Still, 
even with an approved decree, no supplies had yet been procured. We had no means to 
supply, support, and mentor so many, and over such a distance. Aziz’s original zone of 
responsibility around Shkin encompassed roughly ten square kilometers. The addition of 
                                                 
27 Joseph Wolpe, “Cognitive Behavior and its Roles in Psychotherapy: An Integrative Account,” in 
Psychotherapy Process: Current Issues and Future Directions, ed. by Michael J. Mahoney (New York: 
Plenium Press, 1980), 186. 
28 Bandura Social Foundations, 229. 
29 James R. Frazier, “Fixed-Ratio Schedule Responding as a Function of Contingency Descriptions 
and Reinforcement Delay,” Psychological Reports 33, no. 2 (October 1973): 671. 
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Rabat had extended his bubble to fifty square kilometers, and with the new tribal 
signatories, we found ourselves duty-bound to over six hundred square kilometers and 
over 100,000 people (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6.  Expansion of the Corridor from Shkin to Orgun 
The Taliban, though weakened and off-balance, responded. A shopkeeper in the 
Surobi bazaar found the head of the most prominent elder of the Adikhel Kharoti, a new 
and staunch member of the alliance, sitting in the road. The killing sent shock waves 
through the corridor. To complicate matters, our deployment was drawing to a close, and 
most of our equipment had been packed and sent to Bagram Airfield. Fortunately, Aziz’s 
skill as a mediator held the fragile alliance together. Winter was coming, and our team 
was scheduled to return in six months. I had failed to adequately plan for our best-case 
scenario, and it very nearly ended the expansion of the corridor at Rabat.  
My failure in this case was not merely the lack of a solid expansion plan, but also 
a lack of appreciation for how cause and effect might be misinterpreted. The Adikhel 
Kharoti had witnessed the rapid evolution of Rabat over the previous month and 
concluded that if they joined the alliance, they too would receive immediate 
fortifications, training, and mentorship for economic development plans. These incentives 
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proved to be a powerful motivator, which unfortunately could not be delivered. The 
security agreement with the Surobi communities did not include the promise of 
fortifications or Chalwesti training, as we had neither the time nor resources to 
accomplish it. These communities erroneously believed that Rabat’s incentive package 
was a natural outcome of the decision to side with the Afghan government.  
When belief differs from reality, positive or negative consequences cannot 
effectively shape behavior; however, when people choose to act on erroneous beliefs it 
can alter the behavior of observers and thus change the social reality.30 In that sense, a 
poorly-crafted incentive program may inadvertently apply the “social proof” influence 
mechanism, fueling a self-fulfilling prophecy whose outcome greatly diverges from the 
original intent.31  Such a poorly-crafted incentive plan is likely characterized by flawed 
or absent consideration of cognitive processes concerning incentive and reward. It is 
therefore critical to examine the psychological effects of reward on human behavior to 
design a sound incentive plan. 
A prevailing strain of thought among psychologists holds that an intrinsic 
incentive is superior to an extrinsic incentive, to the point which an extrinsic reward is 
even considered harmful to innate interest in an activity.32 However, it may actually 
provide the crucial foundation in which personal interest in an action or behavior is 
cultivated. Agency requires perceived self-efficacy, and efficacy requires skill 
acquisition.33 Many skills are not inherently rewarding or pleasurable, which complicates 
their acquisition. The first time a child enters a pool, the experience may be frightening, 
but as he gains familiarity with the water and learns progressively advanced techniques, it 
may become enjoyable. In time, he may even practice in his free time, join a squad, and 
set personal goals to improve performance. To reach this point of self-motivated 
                                                 
30 Berna J. Skrypnek and Mark Snyder, “On the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Stereotypes About 
Women and Men,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 18, no. 3 (1982): 277. 
31 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 
116.  
32 Bandura, Social Foundations, 240. 
33 Albert Bandura, “Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency,” American Psychologist 37, no. 2 
(February 1982): 122. 
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behavior, an external incentive is often required as a vehicle to encourage the acquisition 
of skills or competencies; this incentive provides the motivation to persevere through 
difficult or painful experiences to reach a personal goal.34 
When considering the case of a child learning to swim, an incentive program that 
provides an ice cream cone following a lesson is fairly benign and relatable. In contrast, 
when considering the case of armed proxies resisting a determined enemy, more than an 
ice cream cone and reassuring word may be required. Additionally, rewards that clearly 
derive from an external source for a narrowly defined set of behavior may appear 
controlling, which tends to weaken the intrinsic motivation to perform the task.35 So long 
as the paycheck arrives, the task is performed, but once the external inducement is 
removed, motivation wanes. Again, Paktika Province bore witness to both our success 
and failure regarding incentive motivators. 
B. AN EXTRINSIC INCENTIVE PLAN WITH AN INTRINSIC GOAL 
Our team returned to the province in March 2011, and enacted a new, proxy-
driven incentive plan. We designed a persistent and relatively cheap program to furnish 
each district governor with a suite of rented heavy equipment, including flatbed trucks to 
move it. The governors gained a new level of responsiveness to local grievances, as they 
could dig culverts and trenches, grade pitted roads, and build earthen barriers to delimit 
land dispute resolutions. More importantly, when the equipment was not being used, it 
was available to rapidly erect village fortifications. Our headquarters and supportive 
infantry brethren provided a seemingly endless supply of barriers, plywood, and beams. 
By June 2011, more than four-hundred Afghan Local Police defended fourteen posts 
securing the sixty kilometer stretch from Shkin to Orgun. The traffic began to flow, and 
the bazaars began to grow. 
                                                 
34 Edwin A. Locke and Gary P. Latham, “Goal Setting Theory,” in Motivation: Theory and Research, 
ed. by Harold F. O’Neil and Michael Drillings (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1994), 
27. 
35 Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and 
New Directions,” Contemporary Educational Psychology 25, no. 1 (January 2000): 59. 
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To harness the psychological effect of reward, an incentive plan must possess 
three characteristics: it must incrementally build competency, capture the power of 
symbols, and provide a challenge.36 In that regard, the heavy equipment package was 
possibly the decisive initiative of our experience in Paktika. It focused on incremental 
increases in a variety of competencies—horizontal construction, hydrology, budgeting, 
and negotiation—as projects advanced and fortifications emerged. The most tangible 
U.S. involvement in the program was our team’s intermittent presence during the 
construction of village fortifications. It was, at face value, an Afghan effort. By providing 
the governors with the means to accomplish an end and the latitude to act as they saw fit, 
skills were refined and produced a high degree of self-efficacy in responding to 
community requirements.  
The symbolic significance of the corridor’s fortifications also reinforced popular 
agency. Symbols are particularly powerful for humans, as they can steer forethought, and 
in turn, perception of outcome probability.37 One of the most powerful symbols related to 
the forts was the halogen beacon. Each fort was equipped with at least a primary and 
secondary halogen spotlight. When the corridor’s defenses reached Orgun, we discovered 
that each site could view the light from the adjacent two positions; a beacon could signal 
from Shkin with a message, and reach Orgun within five minutes, depending on the 
guards’ level of attentiveness. The twinkling spotlights served as a nightly reinforcement 
of ALP commitment to the people of the valleys and passes.  
The third key component of a successful incentive program is linking economic 
benefit to successful completion of a challenging task.38 What could be more challenging 
than adequately addressing popular grievances in a population accustomed to total 
dereliction of civic responsibility, and in the face of armed opposition? The district 
governor heavy equipment package was an ideal solution to such a situation. Conversely, 
                                                 
36 Bandura, Social Foundations, 242. 
37 Dale H. Schunk and Ellen L. Usher, “Social Cognitive Theory and Motivation,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Human Motivation, ed. by Richard M. Ryan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15. 
38 Carol S. Dweck, “Motivational Processes Affecting Learning,” American Psychologist 41, no. 10 
(October 1986): 1040. 
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cash-for-work programs, a common bulwark of counterinsurgency operations in 
Afghanistan, are the paradigm of a short-sighted incentive program.  
In Paktika Province, the pine nut harvest is a labor-intensive period of the year 
and provides a significant portion of the clans’ profit. One technique was to use non-
governmental organizations to hire cheap manual labor from the clans for the pine nut 
harvest to deny a portion of the pool of unemployed young men to the insurgency. I 
readily supported this program at the time, as its logic was sound. In hindsight, the labor 
was mindless, the economic benefit was small, and its duration was very short. Not only 
did we fail to build any level of intrinsic motivation to pursue a challenging task, we also 
denied the nomadic Kuchi tribesmen a significant portion of their income. Traditionally, 
the elders hire the Kuchi to harvest pine nuts and pay them a fair share of the profit. 
Deprived of this revenue, it is not a logical leap to assume the Kuchi increased their 
smuggling of contraband to close this income gap. Nonetheless, the expansion of VSO 
and the agency of tribal signatories continued to build momentum. Managing this 
momentum, however, proved problematic. 
Our political and administrative burdens, however, mounted as the effort 
expanded. In the beginning, the shuras were dominated with talk of the enemy; Aziz now 
found himself mediating tribal disputes, assisting in such trivial matters as the parking 
and sewage management of Orgun, and periodically answering summons to Kabul to 
speak with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The team was stretched thin, dealing with 
periodic attacks on the ALP while still expanding the fortification of the corridor. Two 
additional communities north of Orgun had petitioned to participate in the ALP, reaching 
the edge of the Zadran tribe in Zirok District. VSO had moved far beyond the village 
concept in eastern Paktika, and signs of stress began to appear. Naively perhaps, I told 
myself that with a concerted effort, we could quickly secure the final district remaining to 
link the corridor to the Ring Road: Sar Hawza. My Achilles’ heel at this point proved to 
be our previous successful experiences. 
As people experience success in realizing effects through action, patterns of 
behavior tend to emerge. An action that achieved a desired effect several times before 
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seems likely to provide a consistent outcome.39 I sought to minimize overt U.S. 
involvement in VSO expansion, and as a result Aziz had become a trusted and consistent 
broker when dealing with the tribesmen. The economic benefit of participating in the 
corridor’s alliance had never failed; only our attempts to expand into the rugged 
mountains lining the corridor had met with significant resistance. I therefore assumed that 
our tested and proven sequence of expansion would continue indefinitely. Sar Hawza 
District provided me with a searing mental model of the adage “all politics are local.”  
C. CONTENTIOUS TRANSACTIONS 
Sar Hawza District was affectionately referred to as “the Taliban Headquarters” 
by the citizens of Orgun. Some commercial traffic braved the route to the provincial 
capital of Sharana, but the burnt-out hulks of dozens of vehicles which lined the road 
testified to its reputation. In particular, a sharp bend in the road which Americans referred 
to as “Gulruddin” was notorious for extortion and execution of civilians, as well as 
pitched ambushes targeting military convoys. The Afghans had a different name for our 
final hurdle: “Shwaykamar” (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7.  Sar Hawza District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan 
Shwaykamar held a special form of psychological control over the population. 
Beaten dirt roads and several cuts led north to Marzak village, and then over the 
                                                 
39 Bandura, Social Foundations, 225. 
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mountains to Naka District, the birthplace of the Haqqanis. Marzak was the Taliban’s 
rear area during Operation Anaconda in 2002 and had never truly been wrested from their 
control. From this base of operations, large groups of fighters projected force at will a 
mere seven kilometers southeast to Shwaykamar. Few families in Orgun lacked a 
beheaded victim, and refused to drive west without military escort. As a result, no matter 
what progress our original corridor might make, without control of this terrain east 
Paktika would remain, essentially, an island unto itself. 
The team’s original plan forecast reaching this point after thirty-six months of 
slow and steady expansion. Now, from our latest fortification on the hill above 
Shatowray village, we found ourselves surveying the next move, the last move to open 
the road to Kabul. Only sixteen months had passed. This push, however, would be 
different; no village existed from which to recruit ALP, and the combination of 
Suleimankhel and Hassankhel Kharoti clans populating the area were decidedly hostile to 
VSO. Aziz’s cult of personality had faltered in Sar Hawza. We encountered obstacles 
from competing power brokers in the past; the Otmanzai of northern Bermel and the 
Pirkowti tribe of eastern Orgun district had both successfully denied our political and 
military maneuvers. However, these tribal areas were easily isolated and bypassed as the 
corridor crept northwest. We could not bypass Shwaykamar, and so we could not bypass 
the influence of Mullah Yaquob.  
Yaquob was short and unimposing, and was missing his right arm below the 
elbow. He, like most of his generation, had fought the Russians, and done so very 
effectively. The veteran mujahideen commanders who led the siege of Orgun and the 
defense of the Satakandow Pass had returned home to Sar Hawza and Zerok following 
the conflict. Their fame and influence still eclipsed the rising star of Commander Aziz, 
and he did not like to be reminded of this fact. Each shura with Yaquob and his followers 
was a broken record. We exchanged greetings and pleasantries, extolled the value of the 
ALP program, and when that inevitably failed, reiterated the veiled threat of direct action 
against Marzak and Shwaykamar. The tribesmen were unimpressed; they knew, as we 
did, that without tribal support we would have to convince the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) or Afghan National Police (ANP) from the provincial capital of Sharana to secure 
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the point. We would have better luck, it was believed, convincing Taliban leader Mullah 
Omar to provide constables. 
Our previous incentive program had failed. Its psychological foundation was 
correct, but political maneuver also relies on the favorable motivation of stakeholders 
with the authority to effect a program’s implementation.40 So long as Mullah Yaquob 
resisted implementation, our expansion was effectively vetoed. The power brokers of Sar 
Hawza would not tolerate any participation from Commander Aziz or anyone associated 
with him. A third, neutral party was required for this political transaction. 
Every transaction carries a cost in time, money, or enforcement, and every 
additional layer of transaction increases cost.41 Direct transactions are completely 
transparent; the consumer deals directly with the vendor to procure a good. When a 
consumer is purchasing groceries, his end is simple and clear, and his power relative to 
the market extends no further than his ability to foment a boycott. These direct 
transactions are the means through which people generally converse, barter, and 
negotiate. The more interesting exchange in the pursuit of shaping human behavior is the 
indirect transaction. The indirect variety is naturally more expensive than a direct 
transaction, as it involves at least one additional layer; however, the marginal cost 
increase of indirect investment is more than offset by the proxy’s social and political 
capital that is preserved or expanded by cultivating degrees of separation. 
The indirect transaction is characterized by its nature, mechanism, and goal. Its 
nature, given the desire to create degrees of separation between the proxy and sponsor, 
may be covert or clandestine. A clandestine effort involves a significant amount of 
transaction costs beyond a normal exchange, and its potential exposure can provide a 
greater liability than asset to a strategic initiative as a result. A covert action is also 
expensive, although likely to a lesser degree. It is generally more feasible to conceal the 
                                                 
40 Grant T. Savage, Timothy W. Nix, Carlton J. Whitehead, and John D. Blair, “Strategies for 
Assessing and Managing Organizational Stakeholders,” The Executive 5, no. 2 (May 1991): 61. 
41 Carl J. Dahlman, “The Problem of Externality,” Journal of Law and Economics 22, no. 1 (April 
1979): 142. 
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identity of an actor than the action itself when violence is involved.42 A third nature of 
indirect transactions is emerging as a contender in the information age: political 
expediency. A politically expedient transaction assumes that the target audience knows or 
can easily deduce the sponsor, but if the sponsor’s intervention is achieving desired 
effects at a threshold which does not prompt a counteraction from opponents, the sponsor 
can escape external judgment and the proxy can avoid internal loss of legitimacy. The 
situation in eastern Ukraine as of July 2014 is an excellent example of a politically 
expedient transaction as it relates to proxies in armed conflict. 
However the indirect transaction is conceived, it must involve an exchange of 
goods or services; to that end, it requires a process to convert sponsor resources – 
financial, political, and social forms of capital—into capacity. A transfer of financial, 
political, or social capital occurs through a wide variety of avenues, and potentially to 
either witting or unwitting targets. A witting target, a proxy in this case, is the middleman 
in the indirect transaction between the sponsor and the target. He may receive financial 
incentives through cash, formal banking, or money service businesses; however, given 
the importance of concealing the scope and nature of sponsorship in an indirect 
transaction, more secure methods are preferable. The use of informal value transfer 
systems such as hawalas, or trade-based money laundering is thus preferable. A witting 
target may also receive political or social capital from a sponsor through lobbying, 
assistance in policy initiatives, and propaganda support.  
The means by which we ultimately seized Shwaykamar, built fortifications, and 
opened the corridor was the result of indirect transactions through witting proxies to an 
unwitting target, and included all forms of capital. While the eventual solution was 
elegantly manipulative, we surely did not envision such a Machiavellian strategy from 
the outset; we stumbled into it by virtue of Aziz’s personal network. We first approached 
the ANA Brigade Commander to discuss options for manning a fort. Provincial Governor 
Mohibullah Samim, perhaps our greatest political supporter, went so far as ordering the 
ANA to man a post if we built it for them. The Brigade Commander, however, was a 
                                                 
42 Loch K. Johnston, “On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations,” The American Journal of 
International Law 86, no. 2 (April 1992): 285. 
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skilled politician and effectively rebuffed the Governor’s attempts. Aziz therefore turned 
to another strong supporter, in words if not deeds, Provincial Chief of Police Daulat 
Khan.  
Daulat Khan was a thin, jovial man, always dressed in a pressed uniform adorned 
with as many badges as the bazaar could provide. His office was littered with parting 
gifts from American military advisors, and the walls were covered with pictures of him 
speaking at the most fashionable gatherings. He was not, however, a particularly 
ambitious man. Daulat did not desire promotion, but rather a strong reputation in Paktika, 
the province of his birth. He had provided Aziz with an increasing amount of 
administrative and logistical support as our effort expanded, and was more than happy to 
claim his share of credit for its success as a result. Through this self-interested patriot, 
Aziz would find the forces required to seize Shwaykamar from the talibs.  
While corruption and bribery is a regular occurrence among Afghan authorities, 
Aziz was painfully aware of the perpetual microscope his political rivals, journalist 
critics, and American benefactors placed on his operations. For this reason, he largely 
prevented bribery and extortion throughout the corridor and his own force; in this case, 
he was sorely tempted to use a portion of his substantial personal assets to bribe Daulat 
Khan. He avoided the temptation through a clever web of capital exchange. Hajji 
Ibrahim, a native of Orgun who had moved to Kabul and amassed a small fortune through 
a string of car dealerships, had received word of Orgun’s pending economic resurgence 
and spied an opportunity. He wanted not only a share of Orgun’s growing automobile 
sales and service sector, but the position of District Shura Chairman, and called Aziz for 
advice and assistance.  
Aziz seized upon the fortunate development, forming a political coalition against 
the sitting Shura Chairman, Juma. Aziz’s network of supporters generated public support 
for the idea of recalling Hajji Ibrahim from Kabul to manage Orgun’s economic future. 
Ibrahim reluctantly accepted this great honor, and arrived with a caravan of luxury cars 
which his Tajik clan had received free of charge through a barter for political favors in 
Kabul. These cars were then sold in the Orgun bazaar at full market value, including the 
nicest one to Aziz. Hajji Ibrahim then wisely invested the money into bazaar and corridor 
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security improvements, whose maintenance required a modest tax from the bazaar’s 
shopkeepers. This tax was collected by the Afghan National Police, whom Daulat Khan 
ultimately supervised. Aziz completed the exchange by publicly praising Daulat Khan’s 
support, initiative, and leadership in Orgun and Sharana. The Chief’s reputation was 
bolstered, his department’s coffers were filled (as likely were his own), and the 
agreement was signed.   
An unwitting target may receive capital through the same processes without the 
use of a proxy middleman; but as such a transaction is essentially covert, this increases 
the transaction costs to the sponsor as additional security measures are required to 
conceal its identity. Additionally, should the sponsor’s identity be revealed, the political 
cost may prove so extreme that the risk was not worth the potential benefit. Therefore, 
the most effective process for indirectly delivering a form of capital to an unwitting target 
is through psychological manipulation of his political and social environment. Since 
action based on erroneous beliefs is a means of altering social reality, in this case 
applying psychological influence to alter belief is a potentially valuable course of action. 
Principles of influence which have proven highly effective in securing compliance 
include: reciprocity, in which a target is provided with a good, prompting a feeling of 
debt; commitment and consistency, whereby a target commits to a seemingly benign 
action and feels compelled to justify the choice through consistent repetition; scarcity of 
time and resources, which relies on the human drive to avoid missing a favorable 
opportunity; and the aforementioned social proof.  
The inadvertent application of social proof, as stated previously, is a sign of a 
poorly-crafted incentive plan; the purposeful and deliberate application of the technique, 
however, is highly effective in shaping social reality.43 Participation in the ALP program 
throughout the corridor began to be viewed as proper clan behavior, and a new social 
dynamic emerged. In April of 2011, the village of Zama, located on the border between 
Orgun and Surobi District at the primary mountain pass into the Taliban stronghold of 
Charbaran, was a house divided. A Kharoti clan populated the southern side of the 
                                                 
43 Cialdini, Influence, 127. 
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community, while Tajiks resided in the northern side; no love was lost between the two. 
Nonetheless, both clans volunteered for the ALP program, and each received its own fort 
in early June 2011, no more than one kilometer apart. The “tale of two cities” continued, 
until a Kharoti ALP infiltrator attempted to drug and murder his compatriots in their fort. 
He laced their evening meal with a powerful sedative, which the patrolmen readily 
consumed—all except one. The insider had informed his cousin, who was manning the 
guard tower containing the halogen beacon, not to eat the food. The cousin quietly 
flashed the distress signal to the Tajik OP, who sprang into action, launching a patrol 
which captured the insider and defended the fort until Aziz could arrive to evacuate the 
sick for treatment. The Taliban group in Charbaran was infuriated, and the following 
week launched an assault on the Kharoti fort; again, the Tajiks responded and assisted the 
Kharoti in repelling the Talibs. Clan distinction had become secondary to ALP affiliation 
and the commercial allegiance, and social capital in the community was enhanced. It was 
our hope that such an outcome would be possible in Sar Hawza if the last lawless point 
on the road could be secured. 
With the Shwaykamar defense agreement settled, we began to consolidate a 
massive amount of construction material and the entirety of the region’s leased heavy 
equipment. This operation would unfold during Ramadan, which provided its own set of 
complications.44 Nonetheless, the effort proceeded. On August 22nd, 2011, the advance 
guard of this massive column, spearheaded by a platoon of Aziz’s men with ODA 
advisors, arrived in Shwaykamar and secured key terrain. Several hours later, a combat 
train of more than fifty vehicles began to arrive; bulldozers and excavators slid down the 
ramps and set to work on the first task: cutting a road up the mountain. Within three days, 
the fortification was complete, and we prepared the defense. Each night the Talibs probed 
the position, firing inaccurate volleys of rocket propelled grenades. We began to wonder 
if Daulat Khan would honor the agreement, but on the fourth day forty ANP arrived to 
man their posts. The probing attacks ceased. Aziz unexpectedly mounted an All-Terrain 
                                                 
44 Ramadan is the ninth month of the lunar Islamic calendar, during which adherents are expected to 
refrain from eating, drinking, smoking, and engaging in sexual relations during daylight hours. Exemptions 
are granted for a variety of reasons, including military necessity; however, in the author’s experience, most 
adherents attempted to minimize their food and water intake, if not actually abstain, which significantly 
skewed expectations of physical labor capacity and combat effectiveness.  
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Vehicle (ATV) and sped towards Sharana, as my ATV and two Humvees raced to keep 
pace and ensure he arrived safely. 
As he reached the bustling Sharana bazaar, Aziz rode in a wide circle, announcing 
on his megaphone, “Shwaykamar is taken! The road is open!” Additional riders were 
dispatched to the Orgun bazaar to proclaim the news. With the fortification manned and 
functioning, one third of the team remained to provide support while the rest of us 
returned to Orgun to refit the column and plan the next iteration of VSO expansion, 
presumably to Sar Hawza village. We arrived on August 24, and on the morning of 
August 26 decided to purchase food from the bazaar to break the fast with Aziz and his 
men. The scene that unfolded was unimaginable. 
Eid al Fitr, the second-holiest of Muslim holy days, marks the end of Ramadan; 
in 2011, Eid fell on August 30th. Traditionally, in Orgun, families reassemble from 
across the country, flooding the bazaar with revelers and music. The music had fallen 
silent in 2006, as the Taliban regained control of Shwaykamar. Orgun natives working in 
Kabul and beyond were effectively isolated. With the road now open, we found that the 
bazaar, despite its significant growth over the past several months, was woefully 
unprepared for the weight of the diaspora’s return. The streets bulged with arriving Hilux 
trucks and taxis ferrying hundreds and thousands of the previously displaced to their 
ancestral home.  
On the night of Eid, we broke the fast in Aziz’s dining room then drove towards 
the bazaar with our escorts. The music, cheering, and interminable snapping of 
celebratory rifle fire grew louder as we approached. The throng became too thick for our 
Land Cruiser to transit; we paused and sat upon the roof and the hood, watching the 
surreal scene in amazement. I turned to Paizullah, my perpetual bodyguard, and shook his 
hand as he smiled at the sight. Paizullah was killed by an improvised explosive device the 
following month as we expanded further into Sar Hawza District. His loss was 
particularly hard for the team and his comrades, prompting a harsh, internal questioning 
of our assumptions, methodology, and general optimism that such suspicious, self-
interested actors could collaborate on a grand project of mutual interest.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As 2011 drew to a close and we buried Paizullah, our demonstrated successes and 
the intuitive logic of expected utility sustained my belief in the power of financial gain. A 
study of competing psychological theories, however, has since offered more 
comprehensive explanations of the tribes’ decisions and individual behavior in Paktika, 
with compelling insights for influence practitioners. A sound incentive plan should seek 
to alter a target’s intrinsic values by enhancing human agency, yet must simultaneously 
enhance the influencer’s goals; how is such a seeming contradiction possible? To create a 
sound incentive plan which motivates true behavior modification, an influencer must 
consider the inherent risks of action (from the targets’ perspective), inspire the targets’ 
action through a narrative that conveys both an ideological and practical concerns, and 
then match incentive to narrative in the most subtle manner possible as to avoid an 
artificial, manipulative perception. 
Risk assessment is cognitively derived from expectation, and expectation stems 
from instinctive biological cues, observational learning, and tangible promises of reward 
and punishment.45 Biological cues, particularly the adrenal “fight or flight” response, are 
activated in situations of severe uncertainty concerning survival, but can be manipulated 
through the reciprocal relationship of environment and cognition.46 One’s environment is 
composed of the physical landscape and cultural patterns of behavior, and these in turn 
form basic cognition patterns of symbolism and forethought which inform instinctive 
reactions of danger.  
As a result, for an influencer, three variables emerge to manage the targets’ 
perceived risk: the nature of the physical environment, the character of social 
transactions, and the probability of realizing a threat or promise. The physical 
environment can change dramatically through human engineering – consider the impact 
                                                 
45 This section summarizes the congruous findings of all the aforementioned theories of behavior: 
Expected Utility, Info-Gap, Social Cognitive Theory, Prospect Theory, Goal Setting Theory, et al. For 
more information on any of these theories, consult the primary sources listed in the footnotes and 
bibliography  
46  Bandura, Social Foundations, 199. 
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of the Eisenhower Interstate Highway System on the physical and cultural character of 
America since the 1950s. On a micro scale, the same tenet holds true: physical 
accessibility provides the potential for enhanced defense and profit. Increased 
accessibility also contributes to the character of social interactions, as once parochial and 
isolated social groups recognize and leverage opportunities for self-interested benefit 
among an extended network. The probability of realizing a threat or promise, however, is 
a more interesting variable as both contenders for legitimacy (the influencer’s position 
and that of the existing authority) are capable of affecting this popular decision in a 
highly dynamic manner. Both parties are, essentially, salesmen attempting to bolster 
“consumer confidence” for their respective ideologies.47  
Salesmanship rests on the strength of a narrative, including the quality of the 
product, the inferiority of competitors, the benefits the product will offer the consumer, 
and most importantly, the consumer’s fundamental need for such a product. A strong 
narrative convinces the target audience that a certain action is in its self-interest, and that 
failure to act now will result in a missed opportunity, possibly with dire consequences.48 
Such positive or negative consequences should include both ideological and practical 
concerns. Potential economic benefit is not sufficient if a sacred ideological value is 
posed as a counterpoint; if a proposed behavior is touted as a defense of a traditional (or 
even sacred) value, and happens to also deliver economic benefit, then such a narrative 
should motivate desired action. 
Given a successful narrative that manipulates risk perception and behavior, and 
which considers both values-based and utility-based arguments, the role of an incentive 
plan is no longer to cajole compliance into a foreign value system or behavioral norms, 
but rather to reinforce the idea that the target’s chosen, intrinsically-motivated action is 
correct on multiple levels. Whether this reinforcement is social, political, or financial, a 
well-conceived incentive plan strengthens the influence concept of commitment, eliciting 
                                                 
47 Consumer confidence is an economic indicator measured by several independent agencies in the 
United States to gauge the average citizen’s level of economic comfort; a high level of consumer 
confidence suggests a high level of job and income security, with corresponding benefits for consumption 
and investment. 
48 Cialdini, Influence, 238.  
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even irrational action to justify previous behavior.49 Incentives can subtly (and in some 
cases, rapidly) shape value systems, but an influencer’s probability of success depends 
largely on the manipulation of perceived risk and accepted narrative. 
Paizullah died as one statement of our opposition’s competing narrative. He was a 
patriot, and the embodiment of human agency, a young man who decided that through his 
own actions he could affect his environment. However, he could not have changed it 
alone, nor could our concerted efforts based on pure Expected Utility, no matter how 
much I may have believed in its efficacy. From 2010–2012, Paktika was a model of 
decision-making under severe uncertainty. Numerous theories attempt to describe the 
nature of such an environment and its decision-making process, but the core truths of 
each academic heritage can be distilled into four principles. Humans cultivate value 
systems which guide thought and action, but these systems are transient and subject to 
influence; humans are sensitive to risk, seek the highest degree of certainty when time 
allows, and will rationalize or justify their decision after the fact; a resonant narrative can 
potentially leverage the former alleged “weaknesses” towards a desired action; and 
incentives are most effectively employed when they are least conspicuous.  
I originally sought to reshape the economic order of eastern Paktika Province. 
What likely happened was, in hindsight, that an effective narrative of the economic 
benefits of the corridor manipulated perceived risk levels, which was reinforced by a 
select group of narrative-supporting data points.50 This environment, in turn, prompted 
action by the tribes, causing a consistency-based opposition to the insurgency (so long as 
the insurgency failed to advance its goals). The incentive plan we originally crafted to 
serve our own ends of corridor fortification (the heavy equipment lease) reinforced the 
commitment and efficacy narrative of the now-empowered Afghan authorities, causing a 
reinforcing loop of behavior, so long as our adversary’s actions did not sufficiently 
counteract it.     
                                                 
49 Cialdini, Influence, 59. 
50 The death of Chamtu and the decisive defeat of the Taliban force in Pirkowti two days later, 
combined with several smaller engagements, tribal actions, and public displays of Afghan patriotism such 
as the “Paktika Security Jirga” in July 2010 suggested a drastic (but fragile) shift in popular behavior, as 
witnessed by the author.  
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In summary, expected utility theory is real and a valuable concept, but it is a 
foundational concept. Social cognitive theory is all-encompassing, but less helpful in 
crafting non-abstract strategies. Perhaps no great thinker will ever promote a theory that 
captures all the intricacies of human thought and action while simultaneously distilling 
them into a simple formula which is academically unassailable. Nonetheless, a potential 
influencer can take heart; every target audience across the globe is waiting to be inspired 
by the latest offer of prosperity. If an incentive plan capitalizes on the nature of risk, 
reward, and supporting narrative, while understanding the importance of bolstering the 
target’s perception of agency as it relates to intrinsic values, then behavior can, in a sense, 
be bought. Nonetheless, buyer beware: “man is not a rational animal, but a rationalizing 
one.”51 There are no sure deals in the field of influence, only marginal risks and outright 
gambles.  
                                                 
51 Robert Heinlein, Assignment in Eternity (Reading, Pennsylvania: Fantasy Press, 1953). 
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